Estelle Ferrarese, The Fragility of Concern for Others: Adorno and the Ethics of Care (Edinburgh University Press, 2021)
Reviewed by Howard Prosser (Monash University)
(This is a prepublication version of this review. You can find the published version in Thesis Eleven Journal, on the T11 Sage website)
The current flow of books on the politics of care, or caring politics, has the potential to help re-calibrate social policy in ways we’ve yet to see. From the affirmation of welfare statism to new ways of arranging work, family, and life in general, these contemporary proclamations will hopefully continue to appear and gain traction. From a scholarly-activist perspective, Lynne Segal’s recent works, including The Care Manifesto (2020) and Lean on Me (2023), establish a strong frame for thinking and acting with care as a central social organiser. The novelty here is built on feminist/socialist foundations that have underpinned this conviction for some time. Care does not equate to mere survival in a context of competitiveness, as many states would have it today. Care for each other is at the heart of our human experiences and thus political praxis. A more caring world is possible.
Is Critical Theory part of this careful future? French philosopher Estelle Ferrarese is convinced that it has an important role to play. Ferrarese’s The Fragility of Concern for Others (2021) traces the place of care in Theodor Adorno’s writings by employing a feminist scrutiny. In contrast to some other care texts, her work mobilises moral philosophy rather than exploring quotidian practices in institutions like the family and the state. These elements have their place in Ferrarese’s book, but her close readings of Adorno propel the text as his thought is placed in contrast and connection to recent feminist thought. The intention is not to deny gender blindness or retrofit feminism among Frankfurt theory’s first, and later, generations. Instead, the book contends that feminism ‘can and must shape the critical act’ and that feminism can ‘rearm’ critical theory. This argument alone positions Ferrarese as an important voice in contemporary Critical Theory.

The Fragility of Concern for Others’ four chapters offer an astute reading of Adorno’s work along with the limpid works on the contemporary politics of care – from Carol Gilligan to Nel Noddings, Joan Tronto to Penelope Deutscher. Ferrarese’s words are highly quotable in a way reminiscent of Teddy’s own aphoristic webs. (Special mention should be made, then, of Stephen Corcoran’s translating acumen.) It is hard to capture the sophistication of the author’s approach. Ferrarese first addresses ‘confluences’ between Adorno and ethical theories of care by indicating the philosophical principles shared by both in their materialism, while also admitting to some gaps. Materiality comes out in ways that may surprise those who’ve cast aside Adorno for newer philosophical loves. Ferrarese sees his work as grounded in an understanding of the human body’s vulnerability which determines a morality understood through the shared concern for others. This logic is also connected to Adorno’s defence of the particular over the universal, which aligns with contemporary care theory precisely because the process of rationalisation can’t cope with so much particular vulnerability. The consequences of this for human social relations are complex precisely because the caring needs of individuals differ. The result is a paradoxical situation for those seeking morality where the norms are set, for care, but don’t quite suffice. The same is true when considering humans’ relationship to the ‘external’ – humans are vulnerable in a vulnerable world that they seek to dominate as a consequence of their vulnerability in a vulnerable world.
Such sentiments often orients Adorno’s work with contemporary thinking about the climate crisis. Yet Ferrarese follows a narrower line around the ethics of care which could be taken in this direction by others should they wish to. Her focus in subsequent chapters demonstrates further that Adorno cares. The second chapter on ‘bourgeois coldness’ outlines the non-caring attitudes inherent to modernity through its capitalist practices which ultimately play out in the institutions underpinning it. ‘Bourgeois coldness’, Ferrarese writes ‘is reflected in an indifference towards others inherent in the pursuit of one’s own interests, an inability to identify with others, a hasty subscription to the inevitable and a carefully maintained narrowing of existence to the private.’ The result is ordered moral indifference.
This portrayal is fleshed out in chapters three and four where the fragility of concern for others must be understood as an ongoing social practice. Adorno’s judgements are interrogated in light of current circumstances, namely shifts in the character of subjectification of care under today’s capitalism. A recognition of these circumstances is important if Adorno’s logic is to be adapted with feminist smarts. The current portrayal of a society as more caring is, for Ferrarese, a completion of ‘coldness’ precisely because it has been incorporated into a normative performance of moral indifference. Society’s structures obstruct the very moral acts that they demand. And yet, as the final part of the book attests, Adornoesque negative optimism resides in the continuity of moral acts because of, not despite, vulnerability. Impotence in the face of built-in indifference can be countered through an awareness that collective politicisation is a just response, if not one that is somehow unaffected by the same constraining reasoning. For Ferrarese, impure alternatives to the present situation are the only possibilities; feminism offers a number of alternative options in its approach to care and an acceptance of putrefaction and the abject. This type of critical reflection is another confluence between Adorno and care theory: accepting discomfort as part of this paradox is at the heart of our historical circumstances. It’s almost the definition of care work – health, child, aged – and its shortcomings.
Enduring discomfort without resignation is not new, but Ferrarese’s perspicacity offers a refreshing way of mobilising Adorno’s prognosis. She presents his tricky modes of thinking in ways that have patent implications for contemporary politics, particularly if we are serious about equitable care as part of our futures. In this way Ferrarese is offering a refreshing direction for Critical Theory’s intellectual offshoots. Or, put better, she forearms a critical care theory. Her purpose is unlikely to win her fans among those now conjuring forces of reaction. No matter. Dispelling such action is precisely where her thought’s power resides. And while this book may not gain as much attention as the more marketable tracts on the politics of care, Ferrarese’s thinking deserves to be applied as part of that growing corpus. Her theoretical insight is a frame for future researchers of care and its paradoxical carelessness.
The Fragility of Concern for Others is therefore much more than an addition to Frankfurt scholarship or Critical Theory’s lineage. It deserves recognition as a powerful work that offers intellectual continuity and corrections for our vulnerable mode of social being. We should pay attention to Ferrarese to sharpen our justifications of care for each other and the world of which we are a part. Take care to seek her out.


