This post is a part of the Thesis Eleven online project commemorating the life and work of Harry Redner
by Jill Redner
Weber’s famous speeches of 1918 and 1919 envisage professionals with a sense of “calling”, a vocation. Not only do they pursue knowledge rigorously, they adopt an ethically responsible attitude to its use. And by following his own calling as a sociologist in this spirit, Weber provided a model for others: he sought to grasp the historical and socio-political forces propelling the most important issues of the time – and to adopt a moral position in relation to them.
For Harry, philosophy was a vocation in Weber’s sense. But pursuing this ideal in today’s technocratic multiversity can seem almost quixotic, because specialist knowledge and technical expertise are cultivated, rather than a general intellectual grasp of problems affecting humanity. Generalists still exist but are increasingly likely to find themselves dismissed as mere “intellectuals”. Harry accepted this situation with good humour: “Though my academic sins be scarlet”, he quipped recently, “let my books be read”. However, there was another source of unease for him in the role of “intellectual”. The historical record is mixed. Intellectuals have inspired major social reforms, but they have also contributed to some of the greatest evils of our time. For every Weber there seems to have been a Heidegger. Philosophers should be obliged to take a version of the Hippocratic oath, Harry once said, so their ideas do no harm. He enjoyed self-irony so this was partly a joke at his own expense, but it also touched on his deepest concerns. He sought throughout his writing-life to understand how intellectuals can be so corrupted or blinded by ideology that they abandon long-held civilizational values and rationalize totalitarian state terror and genocide.
The legacy of two devasting world wars was still potent – in the cold war nuclear arms race – when Harry began writing. Political realists were attempting to limit the physical danger by developing arms control policies, but only isolated thinkers, such as Günther Anders, were directly concerned with the effect on human consciousness of this unprecedented threat to the survival of mankind. Harry was intent on developing a new mode of philosophizing in response to this new level of human destructiveness. He hoped to identify the socio-political and cultural forces driving highly developed, supposedly civilized societies in this suicidal direction. And he wanted to assess the contribution of ideologically driven intellectuals to this history. Philosophers, he believed, must build on the findings of historians and social scientists and also on the great literary thinkers – from Montaigne to Goethe – if they wished to reflect meaningfully on the human condition. This may have seemed extraordinarily ambitious at the time, in the 1970s, but the record of Harry’s achievements over the next forty years vindicates his ambition: major studies of Western civilization, representation, ethics, aesthetics; analyses of the socio-political and economic forces of modernity, of totalitarianism and of globalization; critiques of Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Elias, Wittgenstein; original work in the philosophy of mind. In the brief summaries of his works that follow, I hope readers will see a single trajectory, as one study leads to the next, reflecting an unwavering commitment to understanding the great catastrophes of last century and the current state of western civilization as it becomes submerged in globalization.
Harry’s first two books were written together, the third followed soon after, and together they argue for and demonstrate the mode of philosophizing across multiple disciplines that he believed essential.
The Ends of Philosophy: An Essay in the Sociology of Philosophy and Rationality (1986) argues that academic philosophy, particularly in its British and American form, needed new goals, or “ends”. He was not alone in this view. In the 1970-80s, there was a growing sense of crisis in the discipline (see Ricouer, 1970; Rorty, 1979). Philosophy seemed to be losing its raison d’être: both the natural and social sciences had become increasingly positivistic and had little use for philosophy; in response, philosophy had cut itself off from its traditional roots in metaphysics, was imitating the analytic procedures of science, and becoming increasingly reductive, even scientistic. Pushed to its logical conclusion, this could mean “the end of philosophy” – and the sense of an impasse was sufficiently widespread in the discipline for this prospect to be debated (see Cohen, 1990). To avert any such “end”, Harry proposed three main functions for philosophy. These are: critique of constricting thought-forms and discourses, which he demonstrates in this book; mediation between increasingly specialized and fragmented sciences; and “self-recollection in the present”.
The Ends of Science: An Essay in Scientific Authority (1987) performs the second function, that of mediation between specialized scientific discourses. It analyses the socio-historical changes that have affected the production of knowledge since the Second World War. Classical Science, defined as the investigation of the laws of Nature by individual researchers, has been overtaken by “World Science”, conducted by teams that are dependent on complex technology and institutional funding. Intense competition for this support has led to corruptions that in the words of one reviewer represent “challenges to the very credibility of the scientific enterprise” (Chubin, Davies and Heinz, 1988; Heinz, 1990). The book was very well received by scientists and historians of science and contributed to ongoing discussion of movements for reform (see Whitley, 1989; Böhme, 1990; Gulick, 2004). Its themes and perspectives are richly developed and allied with Harry’s later studies in the history of human civilizations in the book published a year before his death: Quintessence of Dust: The Science of Matter and the Philosophy of Mind (2020).
In the Beginning was the Deed: Reflections on the Passage of Faust (1982) fulfills the third function, “self-recollection”, involving reflection on one of the greatest challenges facing mankind. Faust is the legendary figure of active man, who seeks omniscience or omnipotence in his many literary guises from Marlowe via Goethe to Thomas Mann’s Doktor Faustus. Harry re-interprets this literary tradition and uses it as a lens to focus on the dangerous arrogance of the typically European conviction that mankind can achieve mastery of nature, and through science and technology ensure human progress. Faustian man – in Harry’s analysis – was unwittingly furthering a parallel nihilistic process which led him onto a revolutionary path and ultimately to monstrous crimes against humanity. Auschwitz and Hiroshima stand for all the crimes committed against nature and mankind in the name of progress – whether of race, nation, class, creed or socio-economic system. The book is dedicated to Harry’s natural father who perished in the Holocaust and the stepfather who survived it in conditions of extreme privation. He is thus addressing readers out of the depth of his own experience of such crimes and asking them to join him in recognizing that self-recollection is a collective not just an individual responsibility.
Harry also took practical steps to address these issues. Together we helped establish a Peace Research network in Australia and wrote a history of the nuclear arms race (Redner and Redner, 1983). Then, while at Yale as a Senior Fulbright Fellow in 1987, he worked with leading US policy makers and wrote papers on the crisis in political representation.  He related this to wider problems in symbolic representation generally and subsequently published A New Science of Representation: Towards an Integrated Theory of Representation in Science, Politics and Art in 1994. It is a study of civilization in the tradition of Vico and Comte, but it develops an original theory of culture: namely, an anthropology of symbolic systems from their origins in oral societies through to their highly technical modern forms, which as Paul Corcoran writes “enlarges the traditions of philosophy and cultural anthropology” (Corcoran, 1996).
Culture is conceptualised as a network of symbolic representations, not to be conflated with languages, which are necessary for culture but do not determine it. Both change – but cultures also evolve, becoming increasingly complex in their systems of representation. There are four ideal-types of representation: fetishistic, iconic, mimetic and representationalist, which typically emerge at different evolutionary stages, from the primitive to the highly developed Axial age (700-300BC) and finally the modern era. No value judgements are implied in this evolutionary scheme. As human cultures become more complex, they struggle to achieve coherence. During the modern European era, beginning around 1500AD, for example, there was theological, scientific and political conflict over how to conceptualise reality, but it resulted in a representationalist paradigm that lasted until the end of the nineteenth century,
This paradigm was displaced before the First World War by revolutionary changes in science and culture, from quantum mechanics to atonal music to psychoanalysis, collectively known as modernism; and then after the war by real revolutions, culminating in the totalitarian state terror that almost destroyed Europe. Harry’s next book, Malign Masters (1997) focuses therefore on the role of modernists – and their reactionary opponents – in preparing the intellectual ground for extremist ideologies and politics after the war. It analyses the master works of Gentile, Heidegger, Lukacs and Wittgenstein, who contributed in different ways to the emergence of incipiently totalitarian concepts by furthering the neo-idealist, irrationalist currents of anti-Enlightenment thought that flowed into revolutionary ideologies (see Redner, 1997, pp. 50–51).
After retiring early from Monash in 1996 to take up overseas appointments, Harry produced a series of civilizational studies: Ethical Life: The Past and Present of Ethical Cultures (2001), Conserving Cultures: Technology, Globalization and the Future of Local Cultures (2004) and Aesthetic Life: The Past and Present of Artistic Cultures (2007). Together with A New Science of Representation, they identify three fundamental aspects of human culture: representation, ethos and technics. Representation is the domain of symbolic meanings. Ethos is a basic anthropological concept, referring not to “the whole of a culture but only to that which marks it off as a way of life”; it is the domain of values, made up of ethics and aesthetics. Technics are the sum total of techniques available to a culture, dealing with pragmatic matters of organisation and efficiency.
Ethical Life argues that different civilizations produce different types of ethos and ethics. There are four basic ideal-types. Greek civilization, based on the polis, produced a civic ethos, and an ethics of devotion to the welfare of the city. Court societies, based on monarchies, produced an ethics of honour. Where the state was the dominant social formation, as in imperial China, an ethos of service and an ethics of duty arose. And where church or temple determined the ethos, an ethics of love developed, which relies on a concept of “conscience”, often called a “morality”. Only civilizations that have – as in the Axial Age (700-300BC) – produced great religions and philosophies with a prophet or sage as the ideal figure tend to develop systems of ethics. Concurrent developments are also important factors, like the invention of the alphabet and the rise of texts, which fostered higher literacy and heightened vigilance regarding ethical behaviour.
Aesthetic Life addresses the second domain in which human beings create values, as David Roberts (2011) explains. Art – understood in the broadest sense as the activities of homo ludens – is “the basis for the whole of human culture, which could not have arisen without it” (p.24). The foundational function of art is threatened when it is no longer distinguishable from non-art, and standards of evaluation are not even disputed, since art theory, history and criticism have become separate discourses. Aiming to mediate between these specialisms, Aesthetic Life offers a comprehensive account of the arts, ranging from the paleolithic to the modern era, and across all the great civilizations of Asia, the Middle East and Europe.
Conserving Cultures focuses on technics, as this is the dominant cultural force today, due to the global spread of predatory capitalism, in which utilitarian and pragmatic considerations take priority. Technics in this system have ceased to be neutral “means”, have assumed autonomous cultural value and are supplanting traditional domains of meaning and value. A way of life, for example becomes a “life-style”, which can be bought, and it tends to have similar features wherever the consumer lives. If this trend continues, cultural diversity will be lost, and this could be as damaging for human life as the loss of biological diversity is to the environment.
Harry believed that the decivilizing trends of the present result from the way the forces of modernity that had developed in the West since around 1500AD were affected by the events that devastated European civilization last century, and he set out to identify these effects and assess their implications for the future of Western civilization. A mammoth undertaking, this required four major linked studies: Beyond Civilization: Society, Culture and the Individual in the Age of Globalization (2013); Totalitarianism, Globalisation, Colonialism: The Destruction of Civilization since 1914 (2014); The Tragedy of European Civilization: Towards an Intellectual History of the Twentieth Century (2015); and The Triumph and Tragedy of the Intellectuals: Evil, Enlightenment and Death (2016).
The first task, undertaken in Beyond Civilization, was to develop critical concepts for an historical sociology of western civilization. First, this work recapitulates the main findings of the books on representation, ethics and aesthetics, regarding the evolution of human civilization, focusing on the fourth stage (700-300BC), the Axial age, in which mimetic forms of representation developed and the main ethical systems arose. Rediscovered in Western Europe in a series of Renaissances from around 1000AD, mimetic culture and ethics lasted until around 1500AD. Revolutionary changes in social and political systems, science and religion followed, which introduced the new non-mimetic representationalist paradigm and the modern era supervened. The book then focuses on Modernity, which is analysed in terms of three interacting forces: industrial capitalism, the rational-legal state and science and technology. These forces grew exponentially in the twentieth century, propelled by two world wars, economic crises, the rise of totalitarian states and the cold war, and as a result they now dominate society, culture and individual existence in ways that are “decivilizing” – causing a possibly irreversible metamorphosis in western civilization.
The second task, performed in Totalitarianism, Globalization, Colonialism was to show how these forces of modernity interacted with the destructive events set in motion by the First World War, and also affected the development of non-western societies as they emerged from colonialism after the Second World War. The concepts of civilization and decivilization are also explained in greater detail. Civilization involves “forms of acting, thinking and feeling” which in the West were founded on “a culture of ethics and rationality” – most recently associated with the Enlightenment; it depends furthermore on high literacy to ensure access to canonic texts that embody that culture. Decivilization occurred in the twentieth century, because these Enlightenment values were abrogated by European civilization itself. The State, allied to the military, expanded vastly and co-opted industry, science and technology during the First World War. After the war, revolutionary leaders arose and seized the now huge State powers to institute totalitarianism. This grotesque political formation has been widely studied (Hobsbawm, 1997), but one of its essential factors is still inadequately understood: its ideological component. Harry identifies its main characteristics as scientism, utopianism and violence. And then, adapting Kant’s concept of radical evil, he pinpoints its defining feature: the representation of evil – even genocide – as “good”, as the way of the future.
With this clear, the next question arose: how could political ideas – which even at their most radical before the First World War did not envisage mass murder of whole classes and races of people – be converted into political ideologies so pernicious they rationalized the Holocaust? Volumes three and four of the tetralogy, attempt to answer this question.
The Tragedy of European Civilization studies late nineteenth and twentieth century philosophers for insight into how some of Europe’s most creative minds could have produced such a legacy. Marx and Nietzsche, the great nineteenth century progenitors of the best and worst thought of the twentieth century, are discussed, together with Weber, Freud, Elias, Spengler, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Arendt and Foucault, in order to assess the extent to which their ideas supported, or offered intellectual paths of resistance to, the decivilizing forces of modernity. As Krishan Kumar comments in his review, “The story is not merely one of indictment” (see Kumar, 2018; Bailey, 2016). It is a tragic history – tragic for the millions who perished between 1914 and 1945, for the life-worlds shattered, for the wealth of human achievements blasted, but also for the terrifying abuses of human intellect involved – so some of the great thinkers emerge as tragic figures; some partly, or barely responsible for their legacy; others fully culpable. This is not an attack on these thinkers in toto, but a carefully nuanced assessment of their fatal flaws. The ten studies are too complex to summarise; as one reviewer commented, each chapter could have been a book (Dougherty, 2015). But key similarities and differences can be noted here. Marx and Nietzsche set the intellectual tragedy in motion with the prophetic strain in their writing – Marx predicting revolutionary transformation of Western civilization, and Nietzsche calling for its annihilation, with both seeing violence as the necessary scourge of history.
The “Masters of Social Science” in Part 1, Marx, Weber, Freud and Elias, all believed that Western civilization was at a critical historical juncture, and responded as moral humanists. Marx did historic harm, however, by romanticising revolution. He did not live to see its reality, a generation later. Weber did, and his vision is more realistic. For him, the main danger to civilization lay in the vast powers of the rational-legal State, though he too died before seeing his worst fears realised in totalitarian Germany. The “Untergangsters of History and Philosophy” in Part 2, Spengler, Heidegger and Wittgenstein (Arendt is included as Heidegger’s follower and defender) have far more to answer for. All imbibed Nietzsche’s nihilism, his sense that Western civilization was exhausted and followed him in welcoming its end. Spengler called for a revitalized Germany, under a new Caesar, in which technology would be supreme and pernicious “Jewish” cultural influences eliminated; his futuristic vision was thus ready-made for Hitler. Heidegger dignified Spengler’s decline of the West thesis by interpreting it philosophically and relating it to Nietzsche’s eschatological view of history. In Part 3, “Critics of Culture, Society and Science”, Nietzsche’s ongoing influence is analysed, in particular his treatment of truth, knowledge and reason as masks of the will to power. Transplanted to America by Parisian intellectuals, most notably Foucault, Nietzsche’s mythopoetic thought has taken root in cultural studies, where it has grown into a full-blown anti-rational ideology, spreading contempt for the remains of Western civilization.
Triumph and Tragedy of the Intellectuals attempts to disentangle the positive and negative aspects of this philosophic heritage. European intellectuals began as proponents of reason and social reform in the eighteenth century; yet some of their twentieth century descendants became revolutionary ideologues who supported radical evil. The book aims broadly to explain this transformation in terms of the history of the Enlightenment. It defines the intellectual as a unique historical type, a thinker with an individual, idealistic world-view who (as Melleuish (2021) explains) sought to “understand the world in general terms”. Inspired by the French philosophes of the seventeenth century, intellectuals like Diderot, Voltaire and Rousseau emerged in the eighteenth century and instituted the cultural revolution that provided the impetus for the French Revolution and led generally to great social reforms. “How did what began so brilliantly in the eighteenth century end so disastrously in the twentieth? Part of the answer is what took place in the nineteenth … the century of progress and prosperity” (p. xvi). Many cultural currents flowed side by side: Liberal Humanism, Utilitarianism, Social Darwinism; and Hegelian Marxist or Nietzschean eschatologies of history that saw revolutionary change as inevitable. The latter two portrayed intellect as a mere instrument in the service of great forces such as class struggle, the will to power or the élan vital and were inherently anti-intellectual. This made the conversion of revolutionary ideals into political ideologies much easier, as the Bolsheviks and the National-Socialists demanded uncritical adherence to their quasi-religious principles. Precedents had been set for abandoning critical reason, twentieth century intellectuals could with a clear conscience elaborate the extremist ideologies adopted by right- and left-wing revolutionaries.
But this was only the first step. The next step, vindicating mass murder, only occurred under full totalitarianism (with Stalin and Hitler, but not Mussolini), when the ideologies of radical evil were elaborated. The term derives from Kant, and was loosely revised by Arendt, but here it is reconceived as a unique ideological phenomenon. It has its inception in utopian idealism, expressed as determination to impose a supposedly supreme virtue on the world – and this aspect was already evident in the Jacobin terror of 1793-94, described by Robespierre as the “emanation of virtue” (p.32). Without this ideological intent, even mass murder on a genocidal scale, though undoubtedly evil, cannot be classified as radical evil. Other preconditions are also required. The will of a charismatic leader who interprets the ideology for followers who identify with him fanatically is a sine qua non. Victims too are indispensable: the leader requires enemies so dangerous it is a moral, indeed a sacred duty to eliminate them. Cadres of executioners are formed, bound to each other and to the leader unto death. On one level, this is a rational process: “a purposeful, orderly, and planned program of mass murder undertaken for definite ends”. On a deeper level, “there were fundamental and archaic patterns of relations between perpetrators and victims that were almost as basic as those of hunters and their prey” (p.60-61). The definition of radical evil offered in the first part of the book is an original contribution to the historical literature in this field.
The book concludes with an extended essay on death. The Enlightenment led generally, in Weber’s terms, to “rationalisation, intellectualisation and disenchantment of the world”. The latter included initially “de-demonisation”, since with no afterlife to fear the religious dread of death subsided for rational beings. Yet death has changed its face several times since then and retains a fearful ambiguity. Goya’s famous etching from the “Disasters of War” series: “The sleep of reason breeds monsters” depicts this ambiguity vividly. For one result of the resurgence of irrationalism in the late nineteenth century, climaxing in totalitarianism in the twentieth, was re-demonisation: “Demonic enemies, internal and external, were identified and imprisoned or exterminated” (p.43). This effect, which can be described in Freudian terms as the return of the repressed, was prolonged by the Cold War. Repressed again now in the frantic materialism of global consumer capitalism, it slumbers uneasily. And if the repressed fear of death provokes nightmares today, in this analysis their content is as potentially real as those of Goya’s victims of the Napoleonic wars: ecological disaster, large-scale social dislocation, even nuclear war.
It is against this background of the disintegration and crisis of European civilization in the twentieth century that Harry turned to the two foundational myths of Ulysses and Faust, inherited from Classical Greco-Roman and Biblical Judeo-Christian sources, in Ulysses and Faust: Tradition and Modernism from Homer to the Present (2018). Part I traces the reception and transformation of the Homeric myth of Odysseus/Ulysses in key texts from Virgil and Dante to Shakespeare and Cervantes, and the Faust myth from Marlowe to Goethe. Part II analyses the treatment of the two myths by Joyce, Eliot, Bulgakov, Thomas Mann and Pasternak. Their turn to the inheritance of the past is evidence of both the crisis and the ongoing reach of tradition in Modernism, as these writers sought to find a way to interpret the historical tragedy of the times through their reworking of these enduring myths of European self-interpretation.
They expressed their sense of crisis differently, however, depending on how involved they were with the modernist cultural revolution of the two decades prior to the war (p.130). Modernists generally defined themselves against their artistic heritage, and set out to destroy traditions. These five writers reinterpreted traditions to help them make sense of the present. Joyce’s Ulysses, for example, combines radical verbal experiment with the re-evocation of “the typical, the eternally human” (p.131) that gives myth its universal appeal. They should be understood therefore as mixed traditionalist-modernists, but also seen in the broader cultural context, one of the main features of which was the use of myths to support partisan political interests.
Art had become increasingly intellectualized since the Enlightenment. These writers were artist-intellectuals even if like Thomas Mann, they were critical of those who rallied supporters by means of manifestos, demanding allegiance to their ideas. As intellectuals, they participated in or reacted to the welter of ideas in circulation, some of which were highly rationalistic, as with the futurists; others were irrationalist, utopian, apocalyptic and ultimately anti-intellectual. “Ulysses and Faust became names to conjure with” (p.20). This was the ideological environment post 1914, in which these works were created. Harry’s study demonstrates how to read them with this in mind, and thus to assess the extent to which they exemplify, or criticize, the increasingly ideological function of art in their time.
Quintessence of Dust: The Science of Matter and the Philosophy of Mind (2020), is a summation of all of Harry’s intellectual achievements. It is the fruit of a lifetime’s research in the history of civilization, symbolic systems, representation, art and ethics, and of his pursuit of new ends for science and philosophy. This book addresses one of the most challenging topics in science and philosophy, the question of the relation between the human mind and the brain, and engages forcefully in debates between mechanistic, cognitive scientists, for whom mind and brain are identical, and emergentists, who see them as indissoluble but nonidentical entities. Harry argues for the theory of emergence, drawing on recent research in neurology, psychology and palaeoanthropology, because this theory accounts for the evolution not only of the human mind/brain system but of human culture as a whole, and for the way language and art figure in that evolutionary process. The genius of Descartes has presided over both science and philosophy in the modern era – the era of reductive Classical Science and parallel reductivist philosophies, but now Spinoza, his reviled near contemporary, is becoming an inspirational figure, thanks to his holistic conception of mind and matter. Harry expresses the modest hope that his book “might serve as a demonstration of a new way of bringing science and philosophy together in dealing with such fundamental issues” (p.16). In his review, Miguel Candel suggests that the work achieves its goal admirably.
With this major project complete, Harry returned to the subject that had preoccupied him for many years: the institutional pressures distorting knowledge production in the corporate multiversity. Understanding this as a repetition, in educational settings, of the problems besetting cultural production under conditions of global capitalism generally, he was able to relate it to the civilizational crisis that he described first in Conserving Cultures (2004) and then analysed in depth in the four volumes beginning with Beyond Civilization, published between 2013 and 2016. In a burst of creativity, in less then two years he then produced the three books that neither he nor I imagined would be his last. David Roberts’ essay, published with the extracts in this commemorative issue of Thesis Eleven, sets them in the context of the trilogy and places the trilogy itself in the broader context of Harry’s original contributions to the history and sociology of civilization. It is a fitting valedictory.
 “Politics as a Vocation” and “Science as a Vocation”. In Gerth and Mills (1958)
 Günther Anders (1902-1972) wrote numerous essays about nuclear weapons. See “The Man on the Bridge: Diaries from Hiroshima and Nagasaki” (1959) and “The final Hours and the End of all Time: Thoughts on the Nuclear Situation” (1972). (My translation of the German titles. Few have been translated into English.)
 See the review by Roger Nicholls (1985). See also the review by Paul Corcoran (1984).
 He edited a volume of essays on the work of leading US policy maker, Charles E Lindblom (Redner, 1993).
 Appointments were at the University of Haifa, 1997, then at Darmstadt University 1997-98, where he held the SEL-Alcatel Chair of Interdisciplinary Studies, and at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris, 2000, and at Kassel University in 2009, where he was Franz Rosenzweig Professor in Jewish Studies.
 This book is acknowledged as a significant influence on his own ethical thought by leading Jewish scholar, Jonathan Sacks (2020).
 Juliana Geran Pilon comments: “The tragedy of which Redner speaks continues to affect us all to this day, in ways both manifest and subtle” (Pilon, 2016).
 See the review by Greg Melleuish (2021).
 See the review by Wayne Cristaudo (2021)
 Melleuish (2021) and Cristaudo (2021) both consider other interpretations of this historical development.
 See also the review by Bharath (2021), who describes it as “a profound book”.
Bailey, S. (2016) ‘Redner, Harry. The tragedy of European civilization: towards an intellectual history of the twentieth century (book review)’, CHOICE: Current Reviews for Academic Libraries, 53(9).
Bharath, R. (2021) ‘Quintessence of dust: the science of matter and the philosophy of mind (book review)’, CHOICE: Current Reviews for Academic Libraries, 58(8), p. 781.
Böhme, G. (1990) ‘Redner, Harry: The Ends of Science’, Das Argument, (181).
Chubin, D.E., Davies, R. and Heinz, L.C. (1988) ‘Book Review’, Issues in Science and Technology, 5(2), pp. 110–112.
Cohen, A. (1990) ‘On Reading Postmodern Philosophy: Hiley, Redner and the End of Philosophy’, Praxis International, 9(4), pp. 381–399.
Corcoran, P. (1984) ‘Essays toward Armageddon’, The Age Monthly Review, 4(4), pp. 14–15.
Corcoran, P. (1996) ‘Book Review: A New Science of Representation’, Thesis Eleven, 46(1), pp. 133–135.
Cristaudo, W. (2021) ‘The Triumph and Tragedy of the Intellectuals: Evil, Enlightenment, and Death’, The European Legacy, 26(7–8), pp. 836–839.
Dougherty, J. (2015) ‘Book Review: Redner, Harry. The Tragedy of European Civilization’, The Wanderer Newspaper, 11 December.
Gerth, H. and Mills, C.W. (1958) Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gulick, W.B. (2004) ‘Polanyi’s Scholarly Influence: A Review Article’, Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical, 31(1), pp. 11–23.
Heinz, L.C. (1990) ‘The Ends of Science: An Essay in Scientific Authority. Harry Redner’, Isis, 81(3), pp. 539–540.
Hobsbawm, E.J. (1997) ‘Barbarism: A User’s Guide’, in On history. New York: New Press.
Kumar, K. (2018) ‘“Civilization on Trial”’, Thesis Eleven, 145(1), pp. 134–141.
Melleuish, G. (2021) ‘Book Review: The Triumph and Tragedy of the Intellectuals: Evil, Enlightenment and Death’, Thesis Eleven, 166(1), pp. 184–188.
Nicholls, R. (1985) ‘Review of In the Beginning was the Deed: Reflections on the Passage of Faust’, Comparative Literature, 37(1), pp. 82–84.
Pilon, J.G. (2016) ‘The Tragedy of European Civilization: Towards an Intellectual History of the Twentieth Century’, Cato Journal, 36(2), pp. 438-444.
Redner, H. (1993) An heretical heir of the enlightenment: politics, policy, and science in the work of Charles E. Lindblom. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
Redner, H. (1997) Malign masters: Gentile, Heidegger, Lukács, Wittgenstein : philosophy and politics in the twentieth century. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Redner, H. and Redner, J. (1983) Anatomy of the world: the impact of the atom on Australia and the world. Australia: Fontana/Collins.
Ricouer, P. (1970) Freud and Philosophy. Translated by D. Savage. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Roberts, D. (2011) ‘Review: Harry Redner, Aesthetic Life: The Past and Present of Artistic Cultures (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2007)’, Thesis Eleven, 104(1), pp. 114–117.
Rorty, R. (1979) Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sacks, J. (2020) Morality: restoring the common good in divided times. New York: Basic Books.
Whitley, R.D. (1989) ‘Harry Redner. The Ends of Science: An Essay in Scientific Authority. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,The British Journal for the History of Science, 22(1), pp. 106–108.