If a troubled background does not bring despair or a retreat into silence it can provide fuel for scholarship, especially within the world of social studies. Siniša Malešević’s early years were deeply marked by the break-up of Yugoslavia, giving him enough material for a lifetime; it is not surprising that he has become a leading expert in the interlinked fields of ethnicity, war and violence, and nationalism. He has not left this world behind, despite having his university career in Ireland, and an element of richness in his new book comes from interviews he conducted with participants in the wars of the period. I suspect that his background immediately gave him the intellectual tools to which he has remained committed. For the doctoral thesis that become his first book—Ideology Legitimacy and the New State: Yugoslavia, Serbia and Croatia (2002)—claimed that the organizational and coercive capacities of states together with ideological force and coherence within societies were the basic keys to understand the historical record. In the last years he has added a further element (drawing on the work of Randy Collins), namely the need for these two variables to work at the micro level. This resulting trinitarian approach is ever-present in this new book, not least as it is repeated in several chapters that were published previously as articles. We have something there that has the status of a metaphysic.

The claim of the book is straightforward and powerful: the nation-state is the political form of modernity, a way of life that has become utterly dominant in the modern history of the world—either achieved or, in many cases, still desired. The book explains how and why this is so, concentrating on the means that allow our modern subjectivities to be maintained. He distances himself in the opening chapter from leading approaches in the field: structural claims are seen as lacking accounts of the long process by which the structures themselves were created, whilst those that center on agency fail to realize that they project a finished sense of identity on to the past where it did not exist. He stands close to Michael Mann in seeing our sense of identity resulting from the development of state capacities that nationalize and homogenize social interactions—but closer still to Ben Anderson when insisting that nationalism is less an ideology than a world, best seen as similar to the religious surrounds of the past.

The next two chapters then underline the central claim. Modernity is in a generic sense democratic: social links are horizontal rather than vertical, so that even authoritarian regimes must speak as if they represent the people. One of the pleasures of the book is the sheer range of empirical material presented: a paired comparison of the historical development of Japan and Hungary powerfully supports his argument at this point. The insistence that social interactions take place within national boundaries is then addressed by considering religious identities—seemingly part of much larger social worlds. I think he is quite right to stress the way in which religion became nationally bounded, not least as the extensive power of Christianity within NW Europe came to an end with the Reformation. Malesevic makes his case, however, by concentrating on Islam, and more particularly on its role within Turkey, demonstrating the way in which institutional change has nationalized Islam, indeed turning into a support of that nation-state.

The fourth chapter on national movements and imperial discontent turns in a different direction, to ask in detail how nationalism became dominant. Archival research on Bosnia and Herzegovina before the First World War shows that nationalist movements were weak and inchoate, presenting little threat to Vienna—an important claim that adds to the huge literature on the origins of the First World War. This is not to say that nationalism did not become stronger in the great land empires. But such strength most often came from the way in which the empires treated their different ethnic groups. Some groups never gained official recognition at all, often dying out as a result, but the increase in nationalist sentiment that did occur was the result of discrimination and oppression, especially as the empires faced defeat in war. There was no time for a larger Ottoman or Austrian identity to gain purchase; equally, the new states that followed imperial collapse were forced to nationalize populations whose identities were diverse.

Five discrete studies follow that bolster the general argument by confronting claims present in the literature. First, he disputes the two main theories of a golden age of the past: the sentiments are not constant (as Smith suggested) nor are they mere manipulations by an elite (as claimed by Bauman and Hobsbawm). Rather they change over time as the result of his trinitarian forces, a view powerfully supported by evidence from the Balkans. Balkan material lies behind a second piece of analysis, that concerning the move between civic and ethnic versions of national belonging. The evidence here comes from the history of Yugoslavia, in the interwar years and in those following the end of the Second World War. In both periods the state lacked the organizational power to transcend ethnic differences, and to create civic sentiments at the micro level. Two chapters then concentrate on war. Both victories and defeats can gain mythical status for a nation, but both are not objective—rather they are socially and politically constructed, as it were according to need. The evidence here comes from analyses of Croatia and Ghana, the analysis of the latter being especially innovative and convincing. A rather different point is made about nationalist sentiments in times of conflict: soldiers fight and die for their close fellows, disliking any of their number whose enthusiasm encourage recklessness, whereas civilians often press for something much larger. Finally, an interesting piece of empirical research considers pandemics, particularly that of Covid. Though these are often seen as transnational, there is overwhelming evidence that the responses were distinctively national in character.

A final chapter speculates on the future: given that nationalist subjectivities are relatively recent what forces might undermine them in the future? One striking general thought concerns time: memories can last longer than their institutional support. Then four possible futures and suggested and analyzed: a highly coercive world resulting from climate catastrophe; a world ruled by huge corporations; a quasi-imperial world with blocs largely autonomous unto themselves; and a new world of digital micro-communities, able to survive without the backing of an overarching state. For my own part, I find some combination of the first and the third most convincing, and remain puzzled by any account suggesting that states will wither away.

The character of the book deserves highlighting: the tone has charm and courtesy, extracting the best from every contribution in the whole field. The fundamental judgement to be made is simple: this is the most complete book now available in nationalist studies, summing up the whole field and moving it forward in an original, cognitively impressive manner, altogether a stunning achievement. Nonetheless, I have three critical comments. First, there is something of an exception to the finding—essentially correct though it is—that soldiers fight for their fellows and their localities more than for larger nationalist sentiments: Danish soldiers in 1848 had little awareness of the stakes of the war but letters sent home in 1864 contained strong nationalist sentiments. Secondly, one can argue a little with the view that nationalist movements played little part in the origins of war in 1914. Such movements were weak and little threat to the regimes in question. But one should try to link nationalist studies to the field of interstate relations, thereby discovering a complex mixture. State leaders were not directly threatened but some of them felt that they might be threatened in the future—not least as their rivals tried to support and bolster the nationalist movements of their rivals. A part of the nationalizing drives of empires was to remain large, fearing the fate of the Ottomans, and aiming to preserve substantial territories for reasons of sheer power and to protect the sources of supply and the markets they felt were needed for their economies to prosper. Finally, there are surely some who still hold imperial rather that national sentiments. It is impossible to understand Brexit if one ignores the feelings of some of those who wished to leave—in order to create `empire-lite’. Perhaps that can be seen as a national way of life. But one thing is certain: empires continue to mark the world polity, not least in the United States now seeking tribute from the world as did China in the past.